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SUBJECT NATURALISM, SCIENTISM AND THE PROBLEM OF 
LINGUISTIC MEANING: CRITICAL REMARKS ON PRICE’S 
“NATURALISM WITHOUT REPRESENTATIONALISM”1 
 
David Macarthur 
 
RESUMEN 
Huw Price es sin duda uno de los pragmatistas lingüísticos contemporáneos más 
importantes. Como admirador de su trabajo desde hace mucho tiempo, agradezco la 
oportunidad de realizar un comentario critico de su inflyente trabajo “Naturalism 
without Representationalism” (2004) publicado originalmente en un volumen que co-
edité con mario De Caro titulado Naturalism in Question. Mis comentarios se centrarán 
en este trabajo suyo; discutiré cualquier otro material incluido en sus otros trabajos tan 
solo si sirve para aclarar algún aspect de este trabajo. No discutiré ningún desarrollo 
reciente de la posición anti-representacionalista de Price. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Huw Price, naturalismo, representacionalismo, naturalismo del 
sujeto, cientificismo. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Huw Price is undoubtedly one of the most important contemporary linguistic 
pragmatists. As a long-time admirer of his work I welcome this opportunity to 
critically comment on his influential paper, “Naturalism without Representationalism” 
(2004), that first appeared in a volume I co-edited with Mario De Caro titled 
Naturalism in Question.2 My comments will be focused mainly on this paper; material 
from other papers will only be discussed in so far as it helps elucidate themes in this 
paper. I shall not be discussing recent refinements in Price’s anti-representationalist 
position. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Thanks to Talia Morag for her comments on a draft of this paper.  
2 This paper is reprinted in Price (2011, pp. 184–199). All page references in the main text are 
to this book. 
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1. SUMMARY OF PRICE’S ARGUMENT 
Suppose we think, as many contemporary metaphysicians do, that 
science is our best bet to provide us with an answer to the metaphysical 
question of what the world is really like. Then various things which we 
ordinarily think and talk about – moral facts, mathematical facts, meaning facts, 
mental facts etc. – seem not to be part of the natural world so understood. 
From this naturalistic point of view they are what we might call problematic items. 
Orthodox scientific naturalism (“object naturalism”) then faces a set of issues 
that have come to be known collectively as the placement problem: how are we to 
“place” the problematic items in the natural (or, equivalently, the scientific) 
world? The standard responses, which are too well-known to require 
elaboration here, are naturalistic reduction, error theory and expressivism. In 
line with contemporary metaphysical practice these can be interpreted in 
semantic terms as proposals concerning our concepts of the problematic items: 
to reduce them to natural concepts; to eliminate them altogether or retain them 
as useful fictions; or, lastly, to understand them as having a non-
representational function.3 
 In his (2004) Price’s basic innovation is to dissolve the placement 
problem by formulating a different non-metaphysical kind of naturalism that 
focuses naturalistic attention upon subjects or speakers (“subject naturalism”) 
rather than objects (“object naturalism”) –the latter being the orthodox picture. 
On the standard account, scientific discourse “mirrors” the world as it really is; 
the metaphysical presupposition being that this discourse is genuinely 
representational or descriptive discourse. Without this semantic presupposition 
there would be no placement problem. But this is really a piece of first philosophy 
–to borrow an expression of Quine’s– that is inconsistent with naturalism, 
which is duty-bound to first empirically investigate the functions of language in 
different areas without a priori prejudices about which discourses represent the 
world and how they do so. A naturalistic approach to language is simply part 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See, e.g., Jackson (1998). 
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of a consistent general naturalism. Object naturalism stands charged with being 
not naturalistic enough even by its own lights.  
 This subject naturalist investigation of linguistic function is coupled 
with a functional pluralism, which accepts Wittgenstein’s conception of there 
being linguistic diversity hidden beneath the surface uniformity of language: 
 
We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday 
language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike.4 
 
By focusing a naturalistic and pragmatic gaze upon linguistic function, 
on what we do with the various linguistic “tools” (speech acts, concepts) at our 
disposal, Price argues persuasively that subject naturalism is prior to object 
naturalism – at least in so far as metaphysics is typically conducted in terms of 
semantic notions such as truth-makers and referents and the realizers of these 
semantic roles. In any case object naturalism must be consistent with subject 
naturalism; but the latter investigation appears to invalidate object naturalism 
by undermining its representationalist assumptions. At the very least it is an 
empirical question whether scientific discourse must be understood in 
representationalist terms (e.g., referents for apparently referring expressions, 
truth-makers for true sentences) and the availability of minimalist conceptions 
of truth and reference appears to be all that is needed to capture linguistic 
practice.  
From this new perspective two fundamental themes of object 
naturalism are discredited: (1) science does not provide an absolute or God’s-
eye-view from which to determine what really exists since there is no such 
perspective, each discourse or linguistic framework allowing one to formulate 
existence claims relative to the standards internal to the framework; and (2) 
there is no theoretically substantial way of drawing a distinction between 
representational and non-representational, descriptive and non-descriptive; or 
truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional discourses.5 Ordinary thought and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Wittgenstein (1958, §224) 
5  Since the publication of this paper Price has shifted his position regarding anti-
representationalism. He now distinguishes between e-representations (matters of causal co-
variance) and i-representations (matters of inferential role) and argues for their independence 
of each other. The first evidence for this new bifurcation thesis is, I believe, the second Tilburg 
lecture titled “Two Readings of Representationalism” (2008) [A revised version appears in 
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talk seems better captured by disquotational theories of truth and reference (or 
suitable extensions of them6), according to which ordinary speakers make no 
error in speaking of moral, mathematical, mental (etc.) facts, truths or 
descriptions. But we ought not to read any Platonist ontology off this 
acknowledgement – which would amount to a mirror-image object non-naturalism.  
Semantic terms like “true” and “refers” are theoretically lightweight 
and readily available wherever we find the appropriate grammatical form no 
matter what the content of the discourse in question. We may agree with the 
truth of the sentence “Moral values exist” but still think, like classical 
expressivists, that the natural function of this sentence is not to describe an 
aspect of the natural world studied by science or an aspect of a non-natural 
world in Platonic heaven. What ontological commitments are incurred in 
speaking in these and other ways is a matter for sociolinguistic inquiry, not 
metaphysics. Thus, as Price sees it, subject naturalism “offers the benefits of 
non-naturalism without the metaphysical downside” (p. 133).  
 Let me examine this subject naturalist plus functional pluralist  (aka 
“global expressivist”) position by considering three questions for it: the first 
concerns where to place subject naturalism in a range of contemporary 
naturalisms; the second concerns the question of language and meaning within 
a naturalistic setting; and the third concerns whether subject naturalism is, 
despite its efforts to resist it, a form of scientism.  
2. WHAT KIND OF NATURALISM IS SUBJECT NATURALISM? 
Price explains subject naturalism thus:  
 
… philosophy needs to begin with what science tells us about ourselves. Science 
tells us that we humans are natural creatures, and if the claims and ambitions 
of philosophy conflict with this view, then philosophy needs to give way. (p. 
186) 
 
How we interpret this remark depends upon how we construe the 
crucial term “natural”. Part of the problem of critically examining Price’s paper 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Price (2013)]. But I shall leave this refinement of his position aside since nothing turns on it 
for the purposes of this paper.  
6  Price’s convenient friction account, unlike the disquotational theory, recognizes the 
normative role of truth. See “Truth as Convenient Friction” in Price (2011, pp. 163–183).  
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is that certain key terms upon which his argument turns are left either 
undefined or vaguely defined. These include “science”, “natural”, and “natural 
world”.  
Does “science” refer to natural science only or both the natural and 
human sciences? Price is unclear on the matter and one can point to texts that 
support each of these readings.7 This matters when it comes to how expansive 
the scientific image is, which, in turn, has a fundamental bearing on the 
placement problems of object naturalism that subject naturalism promises to 
resolve. Broader conceptions of the scientific image threaten to close the gap 
between it and the manifest image, which would undermine the original 
motivation for the placement problem.8  
More important for present purposes is the question what “natural 
world” is supposed to refer to? It seems most plausible to read what Price calls 
“natural reality” as the scientific image of reality, since he is appealing to this 
conception to explain the placement problem: the naturalistic problem of how 
to find a place in reality, so construed, for the problematic items (p. 187). 
Taking this as our clue, then, we can understand the key term “natural” as 
something along these lines: amenable to scientific study and explicable in scientific 
terms.  
Now the first sentence of the conjunct above reads: science tells us that we 
humans are natural creatures i.e. amenable to scientific study and to being fully explained in 
scientific terms. In the case of human beings, then, subject naturalism coincides 
with object naturalism, which is committed to a purely scientific ontology and 
purely scientific forms of knowledge and understanding. But the sentence is, in 
fact, false. Science has not shown that persons qua rational agents are fully 
understandable, or completely explicable, in scientific terms.  
For one thing reason has not been naturalized.9 Indeed since science is 
an objective inquiry into the natural world then, rather than thinking that it 
explains the world in its fullness, science simply abstracts away from whatever 
does not fall within its purview. Examples of non-scientific items that are not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For a defense of the narrower reading see, e.g., (p. 132, fn 1); for a defense of the broader 
reading note that Price sometimes refers to the stance of the subject naturalist as 
“anthropological”, e.g., (p. 254).  
8 See Macarthur (2010). Even broader conceptions of the scientific image are generated if one 
considers the objects presupposed by scientific practice as well as the explicit objects of scientific 
inquiry. 
9 Putnam (1983). Fodor (1997). 
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fully amenable to scientific study include people (understood as rational agents), 
actions (in the Anscombian sense of something done under a description for a 
reason), art (understood as having intentional content), reasons (understood as 
irreducible conceptually normative items), human history (understood as the 
history of human action), ordinary artifacts (whose identity conditions are interest 
relative) and much else. All of these only become fitting objects of scientific 
study if we re-conceive them according to concepts whose conditions of 
individuation accord with appropriate scientific standards of impersonality and 
determinacy.10 For example, a person qua living body can, of course, be studied 
by a physiologist or biochemist.  
 Let us compare subject naturalism to liberal naturalism, a non-scientistic 
form of naturalism subscribed to by Strawson, Putnam, McDowell, amongst 
others.11 According to the latter form of naturalism we should not identify the 
natural with the scientific; and so, we should not contrast the natural with the 
non-scientific. The relevant contrast is, instead, with the supernatural. To say we 
are natural creatures then gets its bite from dialectical opponents who suppose 
that we have immortal souls or magical powers and suchlike. Indeed, from the 
liberal naturalist perspective, persons belong to the category of natural non-
scientific items that are routinely overlooked in contemporary philosophy – 
which is blinded by various forms of scientism. This category of things is of 
particular interest to the liberal naturalist who explores the conceptual space 
between scientific naturalism and supernaturalism.  
 Given his metaphysical quietism –according to which nothing counts 
as an absolute perspective (certainly not science!) from which to conduct the 
traditional metaphysical inquiry of Ontology12– one would have thought that 
Price’s subject naturalism is a form of liberal naturalism. That is, a theory 
which accepts the existence of non-scientific forms of understanding and of 
natural non-scientific items. Price writes, for example, that the perspective of 
science is simply one perspective amongst many others, 
 
[Subject naturalism] imagines a scientific discovery that science is not all there 
is – that science is just one thing among many that we do with 
“representational” discourse. (p. 199) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See, e.g., Quine (1981). 
11 See the two collections exploring the philosophical program of liberal naturalism: Mario De 
Caro & David Macarthur (eds.) (2004) and (2010). 
12 Here Price reveals himself as a keen student of Carnap at his anti-metaphysical best.  
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On this picture scientific inquiry abstracts away from various items in 
the world that are recognized in other discourses or forms of inquiry, say, 
moral, aesthetic, and political. If we suppose people (qua rational agents) are 
one of the items science abstracts away from then we are not, after all, natural 
creatures in the sense that Price intends. This will be so in so far as we are not 
fully understandable in scientific terms. But being non-scientific in this sense is, 
of course, consistent with being natural in the other sense (i.e. non-
supernatural) and being amenable to scientific inquiry under various partial re-
descriptions.  
Price’s claim that we are natural creatures is not a simple slip, however. 
It is testament to his denial that subject naturalism need admit any non-
scientific (for him, non-natural) entities. In a review of Blackburn, Price writes, 
 
Non-naturalists contend that there is more to reality than natural reality (or, 
what amounts to the same thing… that the bounds of the natural are wider 
than first supposed).13  
 
Price is unambiguous in his rejection of this option as “involv[ing] a 
kind of metaphysical fairy story”.14 To accept non-scientific items would be the 
metaphysical downside that he thinks subject naturalism saves the 
unreconstructed non-naturalist from. But the liberal naturalist can recognize 
non-scientific items (non-natural realities in Price’s sense) without engaging in 
metaphysical fairy-tales. The bounds of the natural (=non-supernatural) are 
indeed wider than scientific inquiry would lead us to think. Science is an 
abstraction from a richer world. 
Although the denial that science is an absolute perspective suggests 
subject naturalism is a form of liberal naturalism, Price’s considered opinion 
seems to be that while talk of the existence of persons, actions, art, moral 
values, etc. is legitimate – this is the salve for non-naturalists – it must still be 
naturalistically explained in such as a way as to be consistent with nothing over 
and above a suitably scientific ontology. The scientific ontology countenanced 
by subject naturalism is likely to diverge from the scientific image of object 
naturalism, of course, given that the subject naturalist’s version will be the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Price (1996, p. 966). 
14 Ibid.  
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result of an empirically-based functional explanation of scientific discourse 
itself.15  
We can conclude that subject naturalism is not a form of liberal 
naturalism. Indeed there is considerable tension between Price’s impartial 
treatment of linguistic perspectives, of which science is only one, and the idea 
that subject naturalism provides a general philosophical position which gives a pre-
eminent role to a scientific (read: a biological or anthropological (p. 294, p. 
320)) account of linguistic function. I shall return to this point below. 
3. THE PROBLEM WITH A (SUBJECT) NATURALIST APPROACH TO 
LANGUAGE 
Subject naturalism is a linguistic naturalism, a form of philosophy that 
begins with a scientific inquiry which asks, in the manner of an anthropologist 
or biologist, what functions are served by various speech acts (e.g. assertion) 
and concepts (e.g. truth).16 Like Wittgenstein, Price is a functional pluralist who 
recognizes that there are many different functional differences served by 
different regions of language despite the fact that all discourses partake of the 
same “representational” apparatus of propositional form, truth-aptness, logical 
relations (etc.).  
 A key question for Price is whether the linguistic data for the subject 
naturalist is language qua meaningful utterance or language qua marks and noises. The 
first is characterized in semantic, normative and intentional terms; the latter 
not. As Quine saw, science can only accept as data those objects or events 
whose conditions of individuation and verification meet objective standards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Price (2011, pp. 142-3) mentions the centrality of causal and modal notions in science both 
of which cannot be straightforwardly understood in terms of responses to objects of scientific 
study.  
16 Two problems that I shall not discuss here arise for the biological or anthropological 
functional explanations of linguistic practice offered by the subject naturalist: (1) the general 
functions imagined by this form of inquiry may not exist in so far as subject naturalism is, so 
far, mere armchair scientific speculation and local functions (or uses) are available; and (2) even 
if there are the general functions that subject naturalism imagines, there is a further question 
whether they are sufficiently fine-grained to capture conceptual differences we pre-theoretically 
recognize. For example, Price hypothesizes that the function of truth is to make disagreements 
matter. But is the functional idea that we benefit from “pooled cognitive resources” (177) not 
equally applicable to truth-involving concepts like knowledge and judgment? For more 
discussion see Macarthur (2014).  
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where the relevant conception of objectivity is a matter of determinacy, public 
accessibility and reproducibility.17 Scientific data must be available for, and 
scientific results must be verifiable by, all scientific inquirers. It is for this 
reason that Quine, and following him, Horwich, take it that the only available 
linguistic data from the point of view of science is language qua marks and 
noises; a range of naturalistically respectable physical shapes and sounds.18  
 Price shows a clear recognition of this point by his inclusion of meaning 
facts amongst those items that raise a placement problem for object 
naturalism.19 In other words, meaning facts are not part of the scientific image 
of the world. But the problem for Price is that the linguistic ‘objects’ he wishes 
to study are, precisely, meaning facts only manifest at the level of meaningful 
discourse.20 This is the level at which there are speech acts which employ 
various conceptual resources in producing, say, assertions. A characterization of 
language in terms of marks and noises is orthogonal to a characterization in 
terms of meaningful utterance. One cannot derive the latter from the former. 
From a bare description of language qua marks and noises not only is one 
unable to tell what is meant, one is not even in a position to say that anything is 
meant!21 Language qua meaningful utterance is a natural non-scientific item, 
which is not amenable (so construed) to naturalistic study. As Quine noted, 
meanings are too vague, interest-relative and subjective to be fit objects of 
scientific study. But it is meaningful language in this sense that is the supposed 
object of subject naturalist inquiry. 
 It might be imagined that Price has managed to sidestep this problem 
by invoking Wittgenstein’s dictum that meaning is use. Price’s reasoning appears 
to run as follows: use can presumably be characterized in terms of human 
behaviour and since behaviour is an object of naturalistic study so, too, is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This leads Quine to the view that language is ultimately a matter of the stimulation of 
sensory receptors. See, e.g., (1992, p. 19). 
18 Quine (1992, ch. 1). Horwich (2005).   
19 Price (2011, p. 133) notes that the linguistic functions hypothesized by the subject naturalist 
must be “characterized in acceptably naturalistic terms”. But the same point, of course, applies 
to the data for this sort of theorizing. 
20 Price (1997) acknowledges this point in a paper criticizing Horwich’s Quinean conception of 
language in terms of marks and noises. But, as I argue here, it is not clear that Price himself is 
entitled to any other conception of the linguistic data.  
21 For further discussion of the importance of intelligible discourse as a presupposition of 
subject naturalist inquiry see Macarthur (2014). 
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meaning. But the same naturalistic shift we noted with regard to “language” is 
also evident in Price’s use of the terms “use” and “behaviour”. In each case 
there is a crucial shift from a semantic, intentional (non-scientific) conception 
to a non-semantic, non-intentional (scientific) conception. The relevant notion 
of use for the purposes of understanding meaning is normatively-loaded ordinary 
use as manifest in the linguistic practice of masters of the relevant language. 
This is not mere behaviour characterized in the naturalistic terms of physical 
movements or biological states. The relevant notion of use is a matter of 
communicative actions, which are intentional performances done for various 
reasons. Ordinary use of meaningful language is thus distinct from the scientific 
function of physical marks and noises.  
The relevant notions of language, meaning, use, and action are all natural 
non-scientific notions. None of them are fitting objects of naturalistic study 
without changing one’s theoretical focus through naturalistic re-description. 
This unfitness arises in part because all of these notions implicate a 
naturalistically irreducible conception of rational or conceptual normativity. 
Concept use is governed by norms of correctness that are not reducible to 
naturalistic categories. For this very reason both Wittgenstein and Brandom, 
two of Price’s inspirations in the field of linguistic pragmatism, begin with a 
normative characterization of linguistic practice.22 In Price’s invocations of 
Wittgenstein and Brandom as precedents for his own view, this important 
point goes missing.  
 One might attempt to rescue Price’s position by supposing that his 
subject naturalist can simply appeal to ordinary use in characterizing the 
linguistic data. But, although this is not apparent in the (2004) paper under 
review, what the subject naturalist presumes to offer is an immodest theory of 
language, one that does not presuppose that the theorist understands, or can 
use, the language that he or she is studying. 23  But the presumption of 
immodesty is surely wrongheaded.  
Just as object naturalism presupposes subject naturalism so, too, 
subject naturalism presupposes ordinary use – on pain of having no linguistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Brandom (1994). Wittgenstein (1958). And Wittgenstein, unlike Brandom, never attempts to 
explain intentional content in terms of prior normative statuses. 
23 See “Immodesty without Mirrors” in Price (2011, pp. 200–227). John McDowell (1998, p. 
87) explains a modest theory of language as one that relies on a native speaker’s grasp of at least 
“the concepts expressed by the primitive terms of the language.”  
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data of the right kind to theorize about. And just as subject naturalism 
undermines the representationalist presuppositions object naturalism so, too, a 
Wittgensteinian (or liberal naturalist) study of ordinary use undermines the 
theoretical pretensions of subject naturalism in so far as the latter is committed 
to immodesty and recognizing only scientific objects. The trouble for the 
subject naturalist is that admitting this kind of dependency on ordinary use 
seriously compromises the claim that it is a “serious science” (p. 116, p. 257). 
4. THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN PHILOSOPHY: IS SUBJECT 
NATURALISM STILL A FORM OF SCIENTISM? 
Let us return to Price’s explanation of subject naturalism, 
 
… philosophy needs to begin with what science tells us about ourselves. Science 
tells us that we humans are natural creatures, and if the claims and ambitions 
of philosophy conflict with this view, then philosophy needs to give way. (p. 
186) 
 
Here I want to consider in greater depth the relation of science and 
philosophy that is envisaged here. Price’s conception of philosophy owes a 
large debt to Quine who famously remarked that “philosophy is continuous 
with science”.24 As we have seen, Price treats subject naturalism as serious 
science; indeed, since, like Quine, he does not care to draw a line between 
philosophy and science, it is conceived as “science… in philosophy” (p. 199). 
 Price elaborates this vision as follows,  
 
What is philosophical naturalism? Most fundamentally, presumably, it is the 
view that natural science constrains philosophy, in the following sense. The 
concerns of the two disciplines are not simply disjoint, and science takes the 
lead where the two overlap. At the very least, then, to be a philosophical 
naturalist is to believe that philosophy is not simply a different enterprise 
from science, and that philosophy properly defers to science, where the 
concerns of the two disciplines coincide. (p. 184) 
 
But if there is no drawing the line between science and philosophy then 
one cannot take Price’s advice to defer to science where the two overlap since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Quine (1975, pp. 125–6). 
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to do that presupposes one can draw a useful line between them. At the very 
least Price owes us further clarification about the difference(s) between 
philosophy and science. Moreover, where science raises interpretative 
problems it is not at all clear why philosophy must defer to science. Why are 
both not on an equal footing, say, when it comes to how best to interpret 
quantum mechanics, for example? 25  One might fully concur with Quine, 
Putnam and Rorty that philosophy can no longer presume to sit in judgment 
of other disciplines from an imagined God’s-eye-view of the world; but the 
right response to that need not be to say the philosophy’s role is beneath that of 
science. That Price takes it to be so is one indication of a lingering scientism in 
his position. 
 It is true that Price works hard to avoid the charge of scientism that 
paradigmatically characterizes object naturalism. As we have seen, he appeals 
to functional pluralism, the idea that science is one linguistic perspective 
amongst others, in explaining how the scientific image of the world does not 
raise placement problems for moral values, meanings, mental states etc. Each 
of these things is countenanced from standards internal to their own 
discourses. The scientific view of the world has no absolute primacy but only a 
perspectival primacy, as Price explains, 
 
… as functional pluralists, we speak from within the scientific framework but 
about other frameworks. This gives the scientific framework a kind of 
perspectival primacy. Our viewpoint is internal to science but external to 
morality, for example. (p. 142)  
 
But while Price recognizes a plurality of linguistic frameworks of which 
the scientific is only one, the scientific framework does have a special kind of 
priority because it is from this framework that one practices philosophy! The 
scientific framework has philosophical primacy: it is the position from which one 
articulates one’s worldview. Subject naturalism explains the functions of all 
linguistic frameworks and in so doing gives us a picture of the world. It, 
therefore, bears an asymmetrical explanatory relation to other frameworks. 
Whatever theoretical reflection non-scientific frameworks involve is subject to 
functional re-description by way of the explanations propounded by subject 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For a fine discussion of interpretative problems that arise for fundamental physical theory 
see Sklar (2001). 
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naturalist inquiry. The subject naturalist sits in judgment of the function of all 
other discourses, including their theoretical aspects. This is enough to convict 
Price of scientism contre lui. 
 The primacy of subject naturalist functional explanation also leads to a 
primacy of whatever scientific ontology is presupposed in giving these 
explanations. It is not an absolute a priori kind of primacy, of course; but an 
empirically-defeasible philosophical primacy, nonetheless. While Price’s subject 
naturalism is happy to countenance such truths as “Moral values exist” the 
functional explanation of this sentence does not posit moral values as part of 
the natural world. Rather, the subject naturalist is a global expressivist who 
helps himself to the sorts of positive explanations of linguistic function offered 
by local expressivists except now applied across all discourses – of course, 
without the traditional denial of truth or factuality that once gave life to the 
now defunct doctrine of non-cognitivism. Talk of moral values is understood 
in terms of expressions of various sort of psychological attitudes, for 
examples.26  
In other words, on Price’s view, moral values are not needed to provide 
causal explanations of our talk of moral values. And the same will hold for our 
talk of all the other problematic items: numbers, meanings, reasons etc. since 
none of these are causal notions. Thus Price retains moral truths, say, but not a 
face-value understanding of them. Ordinary folk can rightly say that there are 
moral values but the theorist explains such talk without positing moral values.27  
 Consequently, the entities science recognizes in its causal-functional 
explanations are given a certain priority in Price’s explanatory program. And 
this is the basis of the primacy accorded a specifically scientific ontology. The 
primacy in question here is not threatened by the observation that a good deal 
of scientific discourse itself – including modal and causal idioms – will not 
figure in the natural world.28 All that shows is that the scientific ontology of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Although Price likes to trade on the move of globalizing the sorts of explanations offered by 
classical expressivists there is a crucial aspect of their view that he means to avoid. Traditional 
non-cognitivists were interested in linguistic functions describable at the ordinary psychological 
level of meaningful discourse in terms of expressing various emotions or evaluative attitudes 
like resentment. In so far as intentionality is naturalistically irreducible Price must deny that it is 
functions in this sense that are the concern of subject naturalism. 
27 This helps to explain the echoes of instrumentalism in Price’s account even if Price is 
adamant that his account does not accuse ordinary practice of any error.  
28 See Price (2011, pp. 142–3).  
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subject naturalism is distinct from the scientific ontology of object naturalism –
 built as it is on questionable semantic presuppositions. The subject naturalist’s 
ontology remains a scientific ontology for all that. Consider this passage, 
 
The fact that there are no moral properties in the natural world does not 
entail that moral talk is in error, if its function is not to describe such 
properties. Inquiring into its function we find (let us suppose) that it is to give 
voice to certain mental states, distinguished by their motivation role in human 
psychology. Suppose… that this function is one of those appropriately served 
by the core properties of the descriptive language. This would explain why 
moral discourse takes descriptive form, and hence why it involves truth claims 
and existence claims. We would thus have a naturalistic understanding of 
what speakers are doing when they engage in moral discourse, and hence a 
reason to deny that such speakers are guilty of some global error, without any 
concession about the descriptive function of the moral discourse. (p. 141)   
 
It is all very well to accept full-voice that there are moral facts, 
mathematical facts, meaning facts, facts of reason etc. since this says no more 
than that certain sentences are accepted as true – “facts” here being a linguistic 
notion equivalent to true propositions. 29 The functions of these different 
discourses (each a topic for subject naturalist inquiry) are, by hypothesis, all 
well served by the core properties of descriptive discourse (another topic for 
study): assertoric language is, in a favourite Wittgensteinian metaphor, a 
“multi-purpose tool” (p. 222).30 But it is quite another thing to accept that 
there are moral values, meanings, reasons etc. on a face-value understanding, which 
does not explain away these existential locutions in other terms from the 
theoretical stance.  
Subject naturalism is committed to this explaining-away strategy as 
Price’s remarks above make clear. We are right to say there are moral truths 
(properties, facts, descriptions) but this is explained theoretically in such a way 
that “there are no moral properties in the natural world”. That is, moral 
properties are not needed to causally explain our talk about them. No other 
ground of their worldly existence is considered. Despite the linguistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Price (2011, p. 164, fn. 1).  
30 In a number of places Price suggests that the best account of the core property of assertoric 
discourse is Brandom’s account in terms of giving and asking for reasons. For example see 
(Macarthur & Price, 2011, p. 247).  
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sophistication, the resulting picture is surprisingly traditional in its denial that 
the problematic items (according to object naturalism) are features of the 
natural world.  
 It may help to clarify this picture to compare it with that of the liberal 
naturalism of Thomas Scanlon.31 For him, too, our talk of moral truths (facts, 
descriptions) is not some sort of global error – indeed, in many cases we are 
right to talk in this way. For him, too, moral values are not, and do not purport 
to be, part of any of the causal orders studied by the sciences. But moral values 
are part of the ‘natural’ world understood in liberal naturalist terms as the non-
supernatural world, not the scientific world. Our talk of moral values needs no 
legitimation from either science or metaphysics. This is not a mere verbal 
disagreement about how to understand the expression “natural world”, 
however. It reflects a significant bias in Price’s position against acknowledging, 
in one’s theoretical voice, the existence of abstract items that are not part of a 
causal structure studied by science. For Scanlon the test of whether moral 
values are part of the natural world is simply that “they are matters we discover 
the truth about simply by thinking about them in the right way”.32 The fact that 
moral values do not figure in causal explanations of our talk about them is no 
grounds for a denial that they are part of the natural world that we think and 
theorize about.  
The idea that the world includes moral values, literally speaking, on the 
basis of our rational sensitivity to them –an idea also defended admirably by 
McDowell33– is dismissed by Price as a non-naturalist fairy-tale.34 But what the 
subject naturalist dismisses as non-natural (=non-scientific) a liberal naturalist 
can countenance as part of an expanded conception of the natural (=non-
supernatural) world because a liberal naturalism allows for both causal and 
rational responsiveness in its explanations of how language operates. That 
Price’s functional explanations are really causal explanations (on a suitably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See “Metaphysics and Morals” in De Caro & Macarthur (2010, ch. 9) 
32 De Caro & Macarthur (eds.) (2010, p. 175). 
33 McDowell (1998b, pp. 50–76). 
34 Of course it is a serious question how, say, moral values unlike causal entities such as stones 
and trees, can be both mind-dependent, in some sense –thereby, avoiding the charge of 
Platonism– and yet objective enough to sustain our critical practices. Here one promising 
suggestion is to appeal to social relations of mutual recognition –a strategy one can find in 
Hegel, Cavell and Brandom.  
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pluralistic conception of causal relations) is another sign of the residual 
scientism in the subject naturalist plus global expressivist worldview. 
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